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I. Introduction 
Gas royalties have been the subject of litigation between lessors/royalty 
owners and lessees/producers for at least twenty years. All these disputes 
relate, fundamentally, to the question of when and where gas becomes a 
“marketable product” in Oklahoma for purposes of making post-production 
cost deductions, which generally involve deductions for gathering, 
compression, transportation, dehydration, and processing. 
                                                                                                             
 * This article was originally presented in November 2017 at the Eugene Kuntz 
Conference on Natural Resources Law and Policy in Oklahoma City. The Journal would like 
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the Kuntz Conference, visit http://www.law.ou.edu/onecenter/kuntz-conference. 
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The question of when gas is a “marketable product” arises as a result of 
Oklahoma’s implied duty to market. The producer’s duty under this implied 
covenant includes the duty to produce a “marketable product” without cost 
to the lessor.
1
 The duty to market is one of three or four generally 
recognized covenants implied in oil and gas leases.
2
 Subsequent to 
obtaining a “marketable product,” the royalty owner may be charged his or 
her proportionate share of post-production costs.
3
 Thus the issue between 
royalty owners and producers relates to whether the producer has obtained a 
“marketable product.” 
II. Mechanics of Production, Transportation, and Sale of Natural Gas, and 
Royalty Payment Thereon 
Natural gas, as produced at the surface, i.e., the wellhead, has different 
and various chemical compositions, BTU (heat) contents, natural gas 
liquids contents, and wellhead pressures, depending upon the geographic 
production area and geologic production strata.  
Once produced at the wellhead, natural gas is gathered in small diameter 
pipes, either from individual wellheads, or from a central delivery point 
(“CDP”) in the field. This activity is generally referred to as “gathering.” 
The gas is gathered from the wellhead and CDPs, and depending upon the 
location and chemical composition, is delivered either (1) to a processing 
plant, where natural gas liquids (“NGLs”) are separated from the residue 
gas, or (2) to a treatment plant, w*here gas containing little or no NGLs is 
treated to remove non-combustible constituents in order to lessen the costs 
of mainline transmission, or (3) directly into mainline transmission 
pipelines, without processing or treatment, for further transportation 
downstream to ultimate users and consumers. In instances where gas is 
delivered to processing plants, the extracted NGLs are transported further 
downstream, separately, to fractionation plants, where they are fractionated 
into constituent components—namely, ethane, propane, butane, and iso-
butane. As natural gas is transported from the wellhead through the 
processing or treatment plants and into the mainline transmission pipelines, 
                                                                                                             
 1. Wood v. TXO Production Corp., 854 P.2d 880, 883 (Okla. 1992) [hereinafter 
Wood]. 
 2. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Bishop, 441 P.2d 436 (Okla. 1967) (discussing 
implied covenants to market, to further develop the leased premises, and to protect against 
drainage). 
 3. Johnson v. Jernigan, 475 P.2d 396, 399 (Okla. 1970) [hereinafter Johnson]. 
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it is usually compressed to allow the movement of greater volumes of gas, 
at lesser cost. 
The activities of gathering, compression, processing, treatment, 
transportation and fractionation of NGLs, as well as mainline transmission, 
are generally referred to as “post-production” activity, as distinguished 
from “production” activity, which is limited to drilling, completing, 
equipping, producing, and operating the well itself. Post-production activity 
costs money, and such services may be provided by independent 
“midstream” companies, or in some instances, by midstream companies 
affiliated with a producer. 
The typical royalty owner lawsuit involves one of two gas sales 
arrangements.
4
 Under the first arrangement, the producer sells gas at the 
well or a nearby CDP to a company which provides midstream services.
5
 
Such sales are often made on a “percentage of proceeds” (“POP”) basis, 
where the purchaser pays the producer a stated percentage of the proceeds 
received by the purchaser upon resale of the gas, after the purchaser has 
moved the gas to a downstream processing plant and processed the gas for 
the extraction of natural gas liquids.
6
 The POP contracts may also provide 
that a portion of the gas sold to the midstream company may be used for 
fuel in transportation, compression, or processing of gas, and may also 
provide for a reduction in proceeds otherwise payable to offset the costs of 
off-lease transportation, compression, or treatment of gas.
7
 Under this 
arrangement, the producer will typically pay royalties on the basis of the 
proceeds it receives from the midstream purchaser for the wellhead sale 
pursuant to the POP contract. 
Under the second arrangement, the producer itself or its affiliate pays the 
midstream company to move gas from the wellhead to a downstream 
processing plant, pays the costs of compressing and processing the gas to 
extract natural gas liquids, and bears the loss of any gas used as fuel for 
transporting, compressing and processing the gas.
8
 The producer then sells 
the residue gas and NGLs at the tailgate of the plant, or moves them further 
down the distribution chain for sale.
9
 With this arrangement, the producer 
will typically pay royalties on the basis of the “netback” value at the 
                                                                                                             
 4. See generally Richard B. Noulles, What is Required for Gas to be a Marketable 
Product in Oklahoma?, 85 OKLA. B.J. 139 (2014). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id.  
 8. Id.  
 9. Id.  
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wellhead, after deductions for downstream costs for off-lease 
transportation, compression, and processing. 
Under both arrangements, the residue gas is typically delivered into a 
mainline intrastate or interstate transmission line at the plant tailgate, where 
it is transmitted to the ultimate user or consumer. Under both arrangements, 
the producer may incur costs for treating, dehydrating, separating, 
compressing, and other operations on the leasehold before selling the gas, 
and those on-lease costs are not allocated to the royalty owners. The 
producer’s position is that, under either arrangement, the gas is a 
“marketable product” when it is either sold or delivered into the midstream 
company’s pipeline at the wellhead or CDP in the field. 
Royalty owners, however, have argued that gas is not a “marketable 
product” until it is acceptable for delivery into a mainline intrastate or 
interstate transmission line at the tailgate of the processing plant, and that 
gas is not acceptable into such line until it has been processed for extraction 
of NGLs, dehydrated, and then compressed to the pressure necessary for 
entry into the mainline transmission line.
10
 Thus, the royalty owners argue 
that all costs incurred prior to delivery into the mainline transmission line 
are being incurred to produce a “marketable product,” and under 
Oklahoma’s implied covenant to market, cannot be deducted from the 
royalty owner’s share of royalties.11 
III. The Duty to Obtain a “Marketable Product” in Oklahoma 
Early on, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Johnson that a lessee’s 
implied duty to market did not include bearing the full burden of delivery to 
an off-site purchaser:  
 The lessee is obligated to develop the commodity he has 
found. . . . But in performing this [implied covenant] function, he 
is not required to provide pipe line facilities beyond the lease 
premises. It is apparent from the lease provisions that the parties 
assumed if and when gas was found and produced from the lease 
property that a prevailing market rate would exist at the wellhead 
or in the field upon which a royalty payment could be 
determined. They did not contemplate the lack of a market rate 
which would require the lessee to transport the gas to a purchaser 
at a location some distance away from the lease property.  
                                                                                                             
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. 
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 Under the lease the lessor is only entitled to a certain 
percentage of the gross proceeds at the prevailing market rate. 
As the prevailing market rate is determined at the wellhead or in 
the field so must the term “gross proceeds” be interpreted. 
“Gross proceeds” has reference to the value of gas on the lease 
property without deducting any of the expenses involved in 
developing and marketing the dry gas to this point of delivery. 
When the lessee has made the gas available for market then his 
sole financial burden ceases, and any further expenses beyond 




In Wood the Court rejected the claim that on-lease compression costs 
must be shared by the royalty owner.
13
 The Court reaffirmed its holding that 
“expenses beyond the lease must be borne proportionately by the lessor and 
the lessee.”14  
In TXO Prod. Corp. v. State ex rel. Comm’rs of the Land Office, the 
Court held that dehydration and gathering costs on the leased premises 
could not be deducted from the royalties paid.
15
 The lease gave the royalty 
owner the right to either take the gas in kind or be paid market value. Since 
the take-in-kind right was qualified by the phrase, “without cost into 
pipelines,” the Court concluded the same qualification applied if the royalty 
owner elected to be paid, and held that TXO could not deduct any costs 
necessary to get the product into the receiving pipeline.
16
 It seems clear, 
however, that “the pipeline” the Court referred to in CLO is “the 
purchaser’s pipeline”—not some distant downstream interstate pipeline—
because the Court expressly stated that “the gas is ‘sold’ when it enters the 
purchaser’s line.”17  
Four years later, in Mittelstaedt, the Court answered the certified 
question of whether “an oil and gas lessee who is obligated to pay ‘3/16 of 
the gross proceeds received for the gas sold’” is “entitled to deduct a 
proportional share of transportation, compression, dehydration, and 
                                                                                                             
 12. Johnson, supra note 3, at 399. 
 13. Wood, supra note 1.  
 14. Id. at 881 (citing Johnson, supra note 3, at 399). 
 15. 903 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1994) [hereinafter CLO]; see also Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe 
Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Okla. 1998) (emphasizing that the activities in both 
Wood and CLO took place on the leased premises). 
 16. CLO, 903 P.2d at 261. 
 17. Id. 
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blending costs from the royalty interest paid to the lessor?”18 The Court 
noted that in prior cases, the Court “had to fix the rights and duties of the 
parties according to the language of the leases and the implied covenants 
that go with them.”19  
The Court held that a gross proceeds royalty clause, when considered by 
itself, prohibits a lessee from deducting a proportionate share of 
transportation, compression, dehydration, and blending costs when such 
costs are associated with creating a marketable product.
20
 However, the 
royalty owner must bear a proportionate share of such costs if those costs 
are reasonable, enhance the value of an already marketable product, and 
proportionally increase the royalty revenues.
21
  
The Court also held that an individual analysis is required to determine 
whether the costs are deductible from royalty payments, because in some 
cases a royalty interest may be burdened with post-production costs, and in 
other cases it may not: 
 In both Wood and CLO we were concerned with operations on 
the leased premises to make the product marketable. However, 
this does not mean that costs incurred after severance at the 
wellhead are necessarily shared by the lessors. We expressly 
rejected this approach in Wood. Post-production costs must be 
examined on an individual basis to determine if they are within 
the class of costs shared by a royalty interest. 
 . . . 
 Generally, costs have been construed as either production 
costs which are never allocated, or post-production costs, which 
may or may not be allocated, based upon the nature of the cost as 
it relates to the duties of the lessee created by the express 
language of the lease, the implied covenants, and custom and 
usage in the industry. We conclude that dehydration costs 
necessary to make a product marketable, or dehydration within 
the custom and usage of the lessee’s duty to create a marketable 
product, without provision for cost to lessors in the lease, are 
expenses not paid from the royalty interest. However, excess 
                                                                                                             
 18. Mittelstaedt, supra note 15, at 1204-05. 
 19. Id. at 1205. 
 20. Id. at 1210. 
 21. Id. at 1205. 
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dehydration to an already marketable product is to be allocated 
proportionally to the royalty interest.
22
 
The Court also noted that downstream compression can be chargeable to a 
royalty owner if incurred to transport to a distant market.
23
  
In Howell v. Texaco Inc., the Court, after discussing the preferred 
methods for establishing market value at the wellhead, reaffirmed its rule in 
Mittelstaedt: 
 When the gas is marketable at the wellhead, the reasonable 
post-production costs may be charged against the royalty 
payments. This is so because the referenced starting point in the 
calculations is the value of the gas after processing and the 
royalty owners are entitled only to the value of the gas that is 
marketable at the wellhead.
24
 
In spite of these cases indicating that gas in Oklahoma may be a 
“marketable product” at the wellhead, numerous lawsuits have been filed 
by royalty owners challenging the propriety of post-production cost 
deductions.  
IV. Royalty Class Actions 
Because most gas royalty litigation in Oklahoma thus far has taken place 
in the context of class action royalty lawsuits, a discussion of Oklahoma’s 
class action statute is appropriate. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has found 
Federal Rule 23 to be illustrative in addition to Oklahoma’s own statutory 
regime.
25
 Both statutes have two parts.  
A class can be certified in an Oklahoma state or federal court only if it 
meets all four requirements of the first part of § 2023(A) or F.R.C.P. 23(a), 
and at least one of the separate requirements of § 2023(B) or F.R.C.P. 
23(b). To certify a class, a plaintiff is first required to affirmatively 
demonstrate that (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable, (2) there exist common issues of law or fact among the 
proposed class members, (3) plaintiff’s claims are typical of the remaining 
                                                                                                             
 22. Id. at 1208-09 (citation omitted). 
 23. Id. 
 24. 112 P.3d 1154, 1159-60 (Okla. 2004) (citation omitted). 
 25. Harvell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 164 P.3d 1028, 1037 (Okla. 2006); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 12, § 2023(A); FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
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A plaintiff must also establish one of three requirements under § 2023(B) 
or Rule 23(b). In gas royalty litigation, plaintiffs most often rely upon § 
2023(B)(3), which requires a plaintiff to additionally show “that the 
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual members,” and “that a class 
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy.”27 The party seeking certification of a class 
action has the burden of satisfying all requirements for certification by a 
preponderance of the evidence.
28
  
Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s 2011 opinion in Wal-Mart, 
most Oklahoma state courts routinely certified royalty owner classes, and 
most of those cases were settled, with plaintiffs’ attorneys being awarded 
fees of more than $500 million, with a few exceptions.
29
 An exception to 
this rule occurred in the District Court of Pittsburg County, State of 
Oklahoma. In that case, Judge Taylor denied certification of a royalty 
class,
30
 finding that “the various royalty provisions included in the proposed 
class are materially different, and because Amoco did not treat all royalty 
owners in a like fashion.”31 The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed 
that denial by unpublished opinion, stating: 
We think it sufficient to note that (1) gas produced by the wells 
in question was marketable at the wellhead, (2) the costs 
incurred between the wellhead and the pipeline tailgate to 
prepare the gas for introduction into the pipeline are post-
production costs, and (3) the propriety of deducting these costs 
involves an individualized inquiry of the factors discussed in 
Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, making this issue unsuitable 
for class action disposition.
32
  
The Oklahoma Supreme Court denied certiorari.
33
 
                                                                                                             
 26. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2023(A); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 27. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2023(B).  
 28. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 344 (2011) [hereinafter Wal-Mart]. 
 29. Watts v. Amoco Prod. Co., Case No. C-2001-73 (Okla. Dist. 2001). 
 30. Gillespie v. Amoco Prod. Co., Case No. CIV-96-063-M (E.D. Okla. Jan. 11, 1999); 
Mittelstaedt, supra note 15. 
 31. Id. at 3.  
 32. Watts v. Amoco Prod. Co., Case No. 90,404 (Okla. Civ. App. Sept. 14, 2004). 
 33. Rees v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 211 P.3d 910, 911 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008). 
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In arguing for class certification, royalty owners typically argue, inter 
alia, that “commonality” is met because the question of whether the above-
described costs can properly be deducted from their royalties is a question 
which is applicable or “common” to all members of the putative class. 
Producers, on the other hand, argue that common questions do not exist, 
and cannot predominate, because of (1) the number of different royalty 
provisions which typically exist among putative class members, and which 
provide different bases for royalty calculation,
34
 (2) the number of different 
sales or marketing arrangements which may be present as to the class wells, 
and (3) the differing qualities of gas produced from each well, which will 
affect the “marketability” of the gas.35 Royalty owners have countered these 
arguments by contending that a producer’s uniform payment methodology 
obviates the need for a lease-by-lease review, and that the differing 
marketing arrangements or qualities of gas do not prevent certification, 
because gas is never marketable until it is in a condition to be received by a 
mainline transmission line. 
Until passage of the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”),36 few class 
action royalty cases were heard by federal courts in Oklahoma.
37
 After the 
passage of CAFA in 2005, defendant producers and operators began 
removing putative royalty owner class actions to the federal courts. Most 
were removed to the Western District of Oklahoma, where the federal 
judges appeared to follow suit with the state court judges based on the fact 
that the defendant producers paid all the royalty owners using the same 
payment methodology, regardless of lease language.
38
  
                                                                                                             
 34. Some of those provisions include royalty based upon “proceeds at the mouth of the 
well,” “market price for the gas sold, used off the premises or in the manufacture of products 
therefrom,” “gross proceeds at the prevailing market rate,” “net proceeds realized . . . less 
the cost incurred by Lessee,”  take-in-kind, “gross proceeds” with no deductions, and 
“market price at the well,” i.e., gas will not be sold to any purchaser at less than standard 
market price. 
 35. See Watts, supra note 32. 
 36. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1), et seq. 
 37. An exception is Gillespie v. Amoco Prod. Co., supra note 30, in which Judge Miles-
LaGrange refused to certify a royalty class, finding that “Amoco’s liability as to a particular 
plaintiff or proposed class member depends upon facts and circumstances unique to that 
plaintiff or proposed class member.” Slip op. at 7. Judge Miles-LaGrange specifically 
“disagree[d] with the plaintiffs’ contention that variances in the language of the leases 
involved do not matter and their contention that the costs at issue in connection with the 
proposed class members’ claims are without exception neither deductible nor permitted as a 
matter of law.” Id. at n.7. 
 38. See Naylor Farms, Inc. v. Anadarko OGC Co., 2009 WL 8572026 (W.D. Okla. 
2009); Beer v. XTO Energy, Inc., 2009 WL 764500 (W.D. Okla. 2009); Hill v. Kaiser-
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1168 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
However, the Wal-Mart decision in 2011 changed the landscape with 
respect to the certification of class actions. Prior to Wal-Mart, class actions 
were routinely certified in Oklahoma on the basis of the existence of 
“common” questions of law or fact which plaintiffs contended could be 
posed with respect to all putative class members.
39
 It was not until the 
Supreme Court’s Wal-Mart decision that a detailed framework was set forth 
to determine whether a plaintiff could meet Rule 23’s “commonality” 
requirement. The Court held that establishing common questions of law and 
fact under Rule 23(a)(2) requires more than merely posing questions that 
are “common” to a proposed class.40 Rather, the claims “must depend upon 
a common contention” and the common contention “must be of such a 
nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that 
determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the 
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”41 “What matters to class 
certification is not the raising of common ‘questions’—even in droves—but 
rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers 
to drive the resolution of the litigation.”42 “Dissimilarities within the 
proposed class are what have the potential to impede the generation of 
common answers.”43 Wal-Mart encouraged trial courts to conduct a 
“rigorous analysis” when determining if the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) 
have been satisfied. 
In light of the 2011 Wal-Mart decision, two decisions by the Oklahoma 
Court of Civil Appeals (“COCA”) reversed class certification orders issued 
by state court judges. In one such case, the plaintiffs sought class 
certification against an operator for “underpayment of royalties based on 
deduction of post-production costs.”44 In reversing the trial court’s 
certification order, the COCA recognized the myriad of interests which 
must be addressed in oil and gas royalty actions, and concluded those 
interests precluded class certification, because while the class 
                                                                                                             
Francis Oil Co., 2010 WL 2474051 (W.D. Okla. 2010); Hill v. Marathon Oil Co., 2010 WL 
2365447 (W.D. Okla. 2010); Fankhouser v. XTO Energy, Inc., 2010 WL 5256807 (W.D. 
Okla. 2010). 
 39. Wal-Mart, supra note 28. 
 40. Id. at 2551 (noting that the language of Rule 23(a)(2) “is easy to misread, since any 
competently crafted class complaint literally raises common ‘questions’”) (internal citation 
and quotations omitted). 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Panola Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Unit Petroleum Co., 287 P.3d 1033 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 2012). 
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representative’s claims were based upon the lessee’s implied duty to 
market, “this duty is not owed to all royalty owners,” because the class 
defined in Panola included force-pooled royalty owners whose claims 
would necessarily differ from the claims of the remainder of the class.
45
 The 
court also found that because there were a number of different oil and gas 
leases with different royalty calculation provisions,  
[e]ach of these lease types requires a different inquiry in 
determining the royalty owner’s claim for underpayment of 
royalties based on deduction of post-production costs. Therefore, 
each lease type would require the definition of a separate sub-
class. We are unable to find a class action combining claimants 




Similarly, the COCA reversed a district court order certifying a statewide 
class of royalty owners in an action for underpayment of royalties.
47
 The 
COCA found that the requirements of commonality and superiority had not 
been met because (1) whether the costs for the services at issue could be 
deducted from royalties depended upon lease language and the 
marketability of the gas before the costs were incurred, (2) the leases at 
issue had varying royalty clauses, and some royalty owners had only 
pooling orders with the defendant, (3) the gas at issue was produced from 
over 1,000 fields in Oklahoma and would require individual determinations 
regarding the marketability of gas from each field, (4) the question of when 
and where particular gas is marketable is not settled in Oklahoma, and (5) 
even though the defendant used a “common method” to calculate all 
royalties, common issues did not predominate over individual issues and a 
class was not the superior method for resolving claims, because of the 




After Wal-Mart, three judges in the Western District of Oklahoma also 
denied class certification motions. Judge Miles-LaGrange found that the 
plaintiff had not demonstrated “typicality” under Rule 23 because “the 
                                                                                                             
 45. Id. at 1036. 
 46. Id. at 1036-37. 
 47. Fitzgerald v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., Case No. 111,566 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014). 
Fitzgerald was originally released for publication by the COCA. However, on June 2, 2014, 
the opinion was withdrawn from publication without explanation. 
 48. Id. at 11, 15. 
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claims of the proposed class plaintiff Stanley Tucker are not typical of the 
proposed class member’s claims involving hundreds of lease provisions.”49   
Similarly, Judge Miles-LaGrange refused to certify a class of royalty 
owners in 114 wells for the same reasons, namely, that (1) varying royalty 
terms in the Plaintiffs’ and class members’ leases “impedes generation of 
common answers,” (2) the “central issue” of whether the defendant 
underpaid royalties could not be resolved “in one stroke,” and (3) the 
varying lease terms would result in different answers to the allegedly 
common question.
50
   
In the second such case, Judge Friot found that the plaintiff had not 
satisfied the “commonality” requirement because of lease specific issues.51 
Because of this, the plaintiff had also failed to establish the requirements 
for “predominance” and “superiority.”52 And Judge Heaton found the 
plaintiff had failed to establish “predominance,” pointing out that “merely 
raising a common legal theory is not enough because commonality requires 
a common contention ‘of such nature that it is capable of class-wide 
resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will 
resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in 
one stroke.’”53  
However, even after Wal-Mart, two Oklahoma federal courts certified 
classes of royalty owners.
54
 In QEP, Judge Russell certified a class of 
royalty owners partially based upon the defendant’s common payment 
methodology which did not take into account individual lease variances.
55
 




As a result of these conflicting federal decisions involving certification 
of royalty owner classes, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, on June 26, 
2012, granted permission to appeal the class certification orders.
57
 By 
                                                                                                             
 49. Tucker v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 2011 WL 6018406, at *8 (W.D. Okla. 2011). 
 50. Morrison v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 280 F.R.D. 621, 625 (W.D. Okla. 2012). 
 51. Foster v. Merit Energy Co., 282 F.R.D. 541, 560 (W.D. Okla. 2012). 
 52. Id. at 562-63. 
 53. Foster v. Apache Corp., 285 F.R.D. 632, 641 (W.D. Okla. 2012). 
 54. Chieftain Royalty Co. v. QEP Energy, 281 F.R.D. 499 (W.D. Okla. 2012) 
[hereinafter QEP]; Chieftain Royalty Co. v. XTO Energy, Inc., 2012 WL 1231837 (E.D. 
Okla. 2012) [hereinafter XTO]. 
 55. Id. at 503. 
 56. XTO, supra note 54, at *4. 
 57. Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust v. XTO Energy, Inc., 281 F.R.D. 477 
(D. Kan. 2012), appeal docketed, No. 12-3176 (10th Cir. June 26, 2012); Chieftain Royalty 
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opinions issued on July 9, 2013, the Tenth Circuit, relying upon Wal-Mart, 
reversed the district courts’ certification orders in both cases finding that (1) 
stating common questions in a class action lawsuit is not enough; the class-
wide proceeding must generate common answers; (2) the defendant’s 
uniform payment methodology did not establish Rule 23(a) commonality 
because the issue was not capable of class-wide resolution; (3) the district 
courts had not examined whether lease language variations would destroy 
the possibility of resolving common questions on a class-wide basis; (4) the 
district courts must address individual lease language differences to 
determine whether the lease language negates the implied duty to market; 
and (5) the district courts must examine the factual context of the individual 
wells to determine at which point gas is “marketable.”58  
Since issuance of the Tenth Circuit opinions in the XTO cases, Judge 
Russell has denied certification of a royalty class in a subsequent case.
59
 In 
that case, Judge Russell found that common questions could not be resolved 
on a class-wide basis because determination of how much each royalty 
owner had been paid and how much each should have been paid required 
“owner by owner and month by month” calculations.60 He also found that 
the claims of the class representative were not typical of the claims of the 
majority of the putative class members for this same reason.
61
  
After Wal-Mart, the trend of Oklahoma courts to deny royalty class 
certifications has continued, though there are anomalies. In 2015, the 
COCA reversed the state district court’s class certification order, stating 
that because of the variances in lease language and overriding royalty 
interests, and the differing gas qualities and marketing arrangements, the 
plaintiffs had “not met their burden to show that common merits questions 
could be resolved in a single stroke.”62 However, earlier in 2015, a different 
panel of the COCA affirmed the district court’s certification of a New 
Mexico sub-class in a case in which Oklahoma and Texas sub-classes had 
previously been certified, even though the New Mexico sub-class, as well 
                                                                                                             
Co. v. XTO Energy, Inc., 2012 WL 1231837 (E.D. Okla. Apr. 12, 2012), appeal docketed, 
No. 12-7047 (10th Cir. July 5, 2012). 
 58. Wallace B. Roderick Living Trust v. XTO Energy, Inc., 725 F.3d 1213, 1218-19 
(10th Cir. 2013); Chieftain Royalty Co. v. XTO Energy, Inc., 528 F. App’x 938, 942-43 
(10th Cir. 2013) [hereinafter XTO cases]. 
 59. See McKnight v. Linn Operating, Inc., 2016 WL 756541 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 2016). 
 60. Id. at *8. 
 61. Id. at *6. 
 62. Tipton Home, Trustee v. Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co., Case No. 111,735, at 
26 (Okla. Civ. App. Aug. 13, 2015). 
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as the Texas and New Mexico sub-classes, involved thousands of leases 
with varying royalty provisions, and thousands of wells with varying gas 
quality and marketing arrangements.
63
 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
ultimately, without opinion, denied certiorari of the order certifying the sub-
class, as it had denied certiorari with respect to the Oklahoma and Texas 
sub-classes. 
More recently, on February 8, 2017, the COCA reversed the district 
court’s class certification order, stating in part: 
The question of where and when particular gas is marketable is 
not settled in Oklahoma. In addition, there is no categorical rule 
with respect to when post-production costs may be considered 
for royalty valuation. Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK 7, at 2, 954 P. 2d at 
1205 (“in some cases a royalty interest may be burdened with 
post-production costs, and in other cases it may not”). Notably, 
“post-production costs must be examined on an individual basis 
to determine if they are within the class of costs shared by a 
royalty interest.”64  
In contrast to the most recent Western District of Oklahoma orders 
which have refused class certification under similar circumstances, Judge 
Heaton found that the plaintiffs in Naylor Farms had met their burden 
under Rule 23(b)(3) to prove: 
• commonality, because 90% of the leases involved in the case 
were leases containing royalty provisions of the type possessed 
by the plaintiffs, which Oklahoma courts had already found 
contained the implied duty to market, and the court limited the 
class members to royalty owners with those leases only; 
• typicality, because the court was limiting the class to leases of 
the type possessed by the plaintiffs, and because the defendant 
had admitted that the vast majority of its gas was sold at the 
wellhead, under a single type of marketing arrangement, and 
required processing; 
                                                                                                             
 63. Bank of Am. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., Case No. 112,648, at 8 (Okla. Civ. App. 
2015). 
 64. Strack v. Continental Resources, Inc., 405 P.3d 131, 140 (Okla. Civ. App. 2017) 
(emphasis added).  
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• adequacy, because the defendant’s defenses to the plaintiffs’ 
individual claims did not demonstrate any conflicts of interest 
with other class members; 
• predominance, because the court was limiting the class leases to 
those described above, and was excluding the plaintiffs’ fraud 
claims (which would require individual proof of reliance) from 
the class certified;  
• superiority, because the amount any individual royalty owner 
would recover would be dwarfed by the costs of trial, and it was 
unlikely any individual owner would be interested in controlling 
the litigation through an individual action; and  
• manageability, because the court was limiting the class leases, 
and the defendant admitted the majority of gas was sold at the 




Chaparral subsequently petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for 
permission to appeal Judge Heaton’s class certification order, and the Tenth 
Circuit granted permission on June 7, 2017. The appeal was expected to be 
fully briefed by December 2017.
66
 
Thus, while it appears that the broadly-sweeping royalty class 
certifications of the past twenty years may have come to an end or are on 
the decline, some courts, at least, are willing to certify classes where (1) the 
number of lease royalty provisions are limited, and it clearly appears to the 
court that an implied covenant to market exists in this leases, (2) all gas is 
sold at a single location and is subject to a single marketing arrangement, 
and (3) there is no dispute as to whether the gas requires processing.  
The decline in class certification, however, does not mean that royalty 
litigation itself is on the decline; it is simply changing form. The author is 
aware of a number of cases filed as putative class actions where the only 
issue is whether royalty owners have received “untimely” payments of oil 
and gas proceeds under the deadlines set forth in the Oklahoma Production 
Revenue Standards Act (“PRSA”), and if so, whether they received interest 
                                                                                                             
 65. Naylor Farms, Inc. v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, 2017 WL 187542, at *4-9 (W.D. 
Okla. Jan. 17, 2017). 
 66. Id., appeal docketed, No. 17-6146 (10th Cir. June 20, 2017) (briefing completed 
Dec. 14, 2017). 
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calculated in accordance with the PRSA.
67
 The author is also aware of at 
least one royalty class action which was dismissed by the plaintiffs’ counsel 
and refiled as an individual action with sixty-eight individual royalty 
owners as plaintiffs, but which raises the same issues with respect to 
“marketable product.”68  
V. “Marketable Product” in Oklahoma  
Royalty owners in Oklahoma have taken the position that natural gas is 
not a “marketable product” until it meets the minimum quality 
specifications as required by pipeline or distribution companies that 
transport it in a fungible state to market. The author has found absolutely no 
Oklahoma law supporting this position, and indeed, the case law cited 
above shows that the Oklahoma recognizes that gas can be “marketable at 
the wellhead.”69 In addition, the Supreme Court of Kansas, to whom the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court looked in Mittelstaedt, recently rejected this 
same argument, finding that gas is “merchantable once the operator has put 
it in a condition acceptable to a purchaser in a good faith transaction.”70  
In fact, prior to the deregulation of gas in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
almost all gas produced in the United States was sold at the lease by the 
producer to an intrastate or interstate pipeline company. The pipeline 
company bore all the costs of transporting, compressing, and processing the 
gas it purchased, while the producer bore none of those costs. 
Concomitantly, the pipeline company received all the increased value 
attributable to the transportation, compressing, and processing of the gas 
purchased. During this time period, the producer incurred almost no “off-
lease” post-production costs, and gas was generally considered to be 
                                                                                                             
 67. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 570.1, et seq.; see, e.g., Speed v. JMA Energy Co., LLC, 2017 
WL 2547240 (E.D. Okla. June 13, 2017); Ashcroft Grp. LLC v. Silver Creek Oil & Gas, 
LLC, Case No. 16-CV-388-RAW (E.D. Okla.). 
 68. Wattenbarger v. Newfield Expl. Mid-Continent, Inc., 2015 WL 12743740 (N.D. 
Okla. July 29, 2015); Doenges Ranch, Inc. v. Sanchez Prod. Partners, LP, Case No. CJ-
2016-31 (June 21, 2016). 
 69. Howell, supra note 24, at 1159-60. 
 70. Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kan., 352 P.3d 1032, 1042 (Kan. 2015). In 
Mittelstaedt, the Oklahoma Supreme Court looked to the Kansas Supreme Court, quoting 
extensively from the Kansas decision in Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788 
(Kan. 1955), stating that Kansas law is consistent with Johnson v. Jernigan, and that 
“[w]hen the gas is shown by the lessee to be in a marketable form at the well the royalty 
owner may be charged a proportionate expense of transporting that gas to the point of 
purchase.” 954 P.2d at 1207, 1208 (emphasis added).  
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“marketable” when it was in a form acceptable to the pipeline company 
when delivered at the lease.
71
 
However, beginning in the late 1980s and continuing into the early 
1990s, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) embarked on 
a gradual modification of the rules applicable to interstate pipelines and the 
services they may offer. The result was a series of orders which caused the 
interstate pipeline companies to “unbundle” their transportation services 
from their roles as buyers of wellhead gas and sellers of large volumes of 
gas to local distribution companies. 
After this “unbundling,” interstate pipelines no longer needed the field 
pipeline facilities they had built to purchase gas at the wellhead. If an 
interstate pipeline asked permission, however, FERC allowed these 
companies to sell portions of their pipeline systems to affiliated companies. 
These new “midstream” companies then operated the same pipeline 
systems to receive gas from the same wells formerly committed to pipeline 
company purchase contracts. The midstream companies would then either 
purchase gas at the lease and resell it, or transport it for a fee to a 
processing plant, where it was processed and compressed for delivery into 
the pipeline company’s mainline transmission line for ultimate sale and 
delivery to a local distribution company or end user.  
As far as the producer is concerned, the gas produced today is no 
different than it was prior to FERC’s restructuring of the pipeline industry 
in the 1980s and 1990s. The changes to the regulatory framework for 
natural gas sales do not alter the fact that gas produced from the wells 
committed to these former interstate pipeline gas sales contracts was 
“pipeline quality” gas delivered directly to the interstate pipeline. The same 
gas from the same wells continues to be delivered into these pipeline 
systems. Arguably, the gas is as much a “marketable product” today as it 
was before “unbundling.” 
The royalty owners, however, take a different position, and contend that 
after restructuring and “unbundling,” the gas is no longer “marketable” at 
the wellhead, and cannot be marketable until it has been transported to and 
processed at a downstream processing plant, where natural gas liquids are 
extracted and the residue gas is delivered into a pipeline company’s 
mainline transmission line.  
As noted above, the royalty class actions certified so far in Oklahoma 
have been settled. This is due, most often, to the magnitude of damages 
                                                                                                             
 71. See Wood, supra note 1; CLO, supra note 15; Johnson, supra note 3. 
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claimed by royalty owners, which often stretch back some thirty years,
72
 
and are potentially subject to extremely high rates of interest. Thus, final 
judgments addressing the issue of when gas is a “marketable product” have 
yet to reach the Oklahoma Supreme Court. While questions regarding this 
issue were certified to the Court by the Western District of Oklahoma in 
2010, the Court declined to accept the questions, stating in a journal entry 
that there was already controlling Oklahoma precedent on the questions 
certified sufficient to allow the federal court to instruct the fact finders.
73
  
However, numerous Oklahoma courts since that time have recognized 
that the law in Oklahoma is far from settled when it comes to what 
constitutes a “marketable product.” Most recently, on February 8, 2017, the 
COCA in Strack, supra, stated in part: 
The question of where and when particular gas is marketable is 
not settled in Oklahoma. In addition, there is no categorical rule 
with respect to when post-production costs may be considered 
for royalty valuation. Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK 7, at 2, 954 P. 2d at 
1205 (“in some cases a royalty interest may be burdened with 
post-production costs, and in other cases it may not”). Notably, 
“post-production costs must be examined on an individual basis 
to determine if they are within the class of costs shared by a 
royalty interest.”74  
In the November 24, 2015, decision of the COCA in Tipton Home, 
supra, the COCA made the same findings as those quoted immediately 
above in the 2017 Strack decision.
75
 And the COCA stated in part: “The 
question of where and when particular gas is marketable is not settled in 
Oklahoma.”76  
Likewise, federal courts have recognized the unsettled nature of 
Oklahoma’s law. For instance, the district court, in discussing Mittelstaedt, 
noted that “[h]aving left marketability to be determined as a question of 
                                                                                                             
 72. Royalty owners typically attempt to avoid the five-year statute of limitations for 
breach of contract by including claims for fraud which they contend toll that statute by 
reason of the discovery rule.   
 73. Hill v. Marathon Oil Co., CIV-08-37-R, 2010 WL 2365447 (W.D. Okla. June 9, 
2010). 
 74. Strack, supra note 64, at 140 (emphasis added). 
 75. See Tipton, supra note 62, at 20. 
 76. Fitzgerald, supra note 47, at 8.   
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fact, the court did not attempt to define either the term ‘marketable’ or the 
term ‘product.’”77  
Relief, or at least partial relief, may be on the horizon. A non-class action 
royalty owner lawsuit currently pends before the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma.
78
 The appeal pending in Pummill arises from a February 9, 
2016, corrected judgment resulting from a three-day bench trial before the 
District Court of Grady County, Oklahoma. The district court in Pummill 
found, inter alia, that the gas from the single well at issue, which was sold 
to an unrelated midstream company at the custody transfer meter near the 
well, was not marketable at the well because (1) it did not then meet the 
requirements of the downstream mainline transmission lines used to 
transmit residue gas to distant end user markets, and (2) even though the 
gas was acceptable for sale in an arm’s-length transaction at the well, that 
did not establish the gas was marketable because wellhead gas is typically 
sold for a price that is derivative of the downstream values for processed 
natural gas liquids.
79
 The key issues raised by the appellants in Pummill 
include:  
1. “Did the district court err by concluding that gas produced from 
the [subject] well is not a marketable product until after it is 
gathered, compressed, dehydrated and processed into 
downstream mainline transmission pipeline quality residue gas?” 
2. “Did the district court err by concluding that gas produced from 
the [subject] well is not a marketable product until it is processed 
at a downstream processing plant for the extraction of valuable 
natural gas liquids (‘NGLs’) and residue gas . . . ?” 
3. “Did the district court err by concluding that the sale of gas 
under a percentage of proceeds contract . . . could not establish 
that gas was marketable at the well?”80  
The Pummill appeal was filed on February 12, 2016, with briefing 
completed on August 23, 2016. That appeal has been treated within the oil 
and gas industry as an appeal that will likely be of significance to the 
development and clarification of Oklahoma royalty law. Notably, amici 
                                                                                                             
 77. Foster, supra note 51, at 548-49 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
 78. Pummill v. Hancock Expl., LLC, No. 114,703, 2016 WL 6277319 (Okla. Aug. 23, 
2016).  
 79. Exhibit B to Pummill Amended Petition in Error. 
 80. Brief for Appellants, at 1-2, Pummill v. Hancock Expl., LLC, CV-2011-82, No. 
114,703 (Okla Civ. App. 2016). 
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briefs have been filed in the Pummill appeal by the Oklahoma Oil and Gas 
Association, the Oklahoma Independent Petroleum Association, the GPA 
Midstream Association, The Coalition of Oklahoma Surface and Mineral 
Owners, and Tony Whisenant, a plaintiff royalty owner and proposed Class 
Representative in a class action lawsuit. 
If the COCA chooses to rule on the “marketable product” issues in 
Pummill, that opinion, while not necessarily precedent, could certainly 
provide guidance to Oklahoma state and federal district courts.
81
 Indeed, 
two federal district court cases involving royalty owner claims for 
underpayment have already been stayed by Judge Russell pending the 
outcome of the Pummill appeal.
82
 Motions to stay have been filed in other 
federal and state cases as well.
83
  
Finally, and most recently, the defendant moved Judge Payne to certify 
to the Oklahoma Supreme Court the question of what “marketable product” 
means for purposes of the rules of law announced in Mittelstaedt.
84
 While it 
is the understanding of this author that Judge Payne originally seemed 
inclined to certify the question, he denied the motion on October 25, 2017.  
                                                                                                             
 81. Since the initial presentation of this paper, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals has 
issued its opinion affirming the district court’s order in Pummill. Pummill v. Hancock Expl., 
LLC, Case No. 114,703 (Okla. Civ. App. Jan. 5, 2018). Unfortunately, it is not likely to 
provide much guidance to the courts or the oil and gas industry going forward, inasmuch as 
the court found that (1) under the facts of that case, the gas at issue was not marketable at the 
wellhead because Cimarex made no actual sales of any gas at the wellhead to any purchaser, 
and (2) Cimarex did not sustain its evidentiary burden of proving, under Mittelstaedt, that 
the actual royalty revenues would increase in proportion with the costs assessed against the 
non-working interests. Slip op. at 21, 23, 24. The court expressly rejected the definition of 
“marketable production” adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court in Fawcett, finding (1) it 
was bound to follow Oklahoma precedent, (2) it did not find language in Fawcett suggesting 
that the Kansas Supreme Court intended to overturn the existing rule that a lessee-operator 
has the duty to make gas marketable free of cost for field services to royalty owners, and (3) 
Fawcett is factually distinguishable because in that case, actual sales of gas occurred at the 
wellhead. Slip op. at 27-28. Appellants filed their Petition for Writ of Certiorari on January 
25, 2018. 
 82. Harris v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., CIV-15-94-C, 2015 WL 3746989 (W.D. Okla. June 
15, 2015); Frank v. Crawley Petroleum Corp., Case No. CIV-14-1193-4-R (W.D. Okla. Oct. 
10, 2013).  
 83. Chieftain Royalty Co. v. SM Energy Co., CIV-11-177-D, 2015 WL 9451069 (W.D. 
Okla. Dec. 23, 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Chieftain Royalty Co. v. Enervest 
Energy Institutional Fund XIII-A, L.P., 861 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2017); Doenges Ranch, 
supra note 68. 
 84. Hoog v. Petroquest Energy, L.L.C., Case No. 16-CV-463-JHP (E.D. Okla. Oct. 25, 
2016). 
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Clearly, many district and appellate courts in Oklahoma realize that the 
law regarding when and where gas becomes a “marketable product” is far 
from settled. The author submits that until there is a final, definitive opinion 
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court as to when gas becomes a “marketable 
product,” royalty underpayment actions will continue to proliferate. 
VI. Other Recent Decisions of Note 
While not addressing royalty issues per se, the following opinion was 
rendered in the context of a class action royalty lawsuit and could have 
significant effects on class action litigation before the federal courts.  
The case involved an appeal by two objectors after the settlement of a 
class action for royalty underpayments.
85
 In the underlying action, the 
parties reached a settlement for a cash payment of $52 million, with class 
counsel requesting attorney fees in the amount of 40% of the settlement 
fund.
86
 After hearing, the court awarded class counsel 33 1/3% of the 
settlement fund, or $17,333,333.33, as attorney fees.
87
 Two class members 
objected to this fee (as well as the incentive award of $260,000 awarded to 
the named plaintiff) on the basis that the attorney fee should have been 
awarded on the basis of Oklahoma’s “lodestar” approach, rather than on a 
strict “percentage-of-the-fund” analysis.88  
The Tenth Circuit agreed, finding that because federal jurisdiction in the 
common-fund case before it was based on diversity of the parties, the 
doctrine established in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
89
 required the court to 
apply Oklahoma law governing the award of attorney fees in common-fund 
cases.
90
 After distinguishing between “substantive fees,” which are “those 
that ‘are tied to the outcome of the litigation,’” and “procedural fees,” 
which are “those that are ‘generally based on a litigant’s bad faith conduct 
in litigation,’” the court found that the fees at issue in Chieftain were 
“substantive fees,” and as such, in a diversity case, are “therefore controlled 
by state law.”91 However, the court recognized there was no binding 
precedent in the Tenth Circuit regarding whether the federal court must 
follow state law in governing how to calculate a proper attorney fee.
92
 The 
                                                                                                             
 85. Enervest Energy, supra note 83. 
 86. Id. at 1185. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.  
 89. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 90. Enervest Energy, supra note 83, at 1187. 
 91. Id. at 1188. 
 92. Id. at 1189.  
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Tenth Circuit cited cases from five other circuits stating that when state law 
governs whether to award attorney fees, that state’s law also governs how 
to calculate the amount.
93
 The court held that since state law “governs the 
propriety of granting a fee award,” “we must also apply the State’s rules on 
how the amount of the fee is to be calculated because they are ‘rules of 
decision by which the court will adjudicate the right to the fee.’”94  
The court then turned to Oklahoma law to determine how to compute the 
attorney fee in Chieftain, noting that the controlling precedent for a 
common-fund case is Burk v. Oklahoma City,
95
 which is still good law. 
That decision directed that, to enable a court to determine attorney fees, 
attorneys must present “detailed time records showing the work performed 
and offer evidence as to the reasonable value for the services performed.”96 
This would allow the court to determine the “lodestar,” and then consider 
other factors to provide an “incentive fee or bonus.”97 
The district court in Chieftain did not use the lodestar method to 
calculate class counsel’s fee, and class counsel failed to provide the district 
court with the information necessary to apply that method.
98
 In fact, class 
counsel acknowledged that they did not keep detailed time records on 




As a result, the Tenth Circuit set aside the fee award, stating “[t]he 
district court will have to decide in the first instance whether any award can 
be made in light of the absence of contemporaneous time records. It is 
unfortunate that class counsel did not do the necessary homework on 
Oklahoma law.”100  
Class counsel filed a petition for rehearing en banc on August 16, 2017, 
arguing that the Tenth Circuit panel’s choice-of-law ruling conflicts with 
other United States Supreme Court cases that require courts to base choice-
of-law rulings on whether applying federal law to an issue would disserve 
the interests that Erie protects, and that the panel’s state law ruling ignored 
contrary Oklahoma Supreme Court and district court cases.
101
 Numerous 
                                                                                                             
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1190 (citation omitted). 
 95. 598 P.2d 659 (Okla. 1979). 
 96. Enervest Energy, supra note 83, at 1190 (citation omitted). 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 1191. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Chieftain Royalty Company’s Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 1. 
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motions for leave to file amici briefs have also been filed with the Tenth 
Circuit, including motions by Arthur R. Miller, the Oklahoma Law 
Enforcement Retirement System, The Honorable Richard G. Van Dyck, 
Drew Edmondson, Provident Energy, Ltd., Charles M. Silver, and several 
representatives of royalty owners or royalty owner groups. The Tenth 
Circuit has not, as of the completion of this paper, issued rulings on either 
the Petition for Rehearing or the motions for leave to amici briefs. 
In light of the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Chieftain, it appears that the 
wisest course for the foreseeable future, whether in Oklahoma state or 
federal courts, is for class counsel in common-fund cases to keep 
contemporaneous time records, even if they ultimately intend to request 
attorney fees on a “percentage-of-the-fund” basis. 
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